



WG-115 / SC-238 – Counter UAS

24-25 October 2024 – Plenary Session #19

1. Welcome, Introductions, Administrative Remarks by Committee Leadership

Meeting attendees

• Adam Hendrickson	FAA
• Adam Robertson	Fortem Technologies, Inc. (Webex)
• Akiko Kohmura	Electronic Navigation Research Institute
• Alex Milns	EUROCAE
• Amaury Neyron de Saint Julian	Groupe ADP
• Ben Walsh	FAA
• Bianka Karoly	HungaroControl
• Brandon Miller	Air Line Pilot Association
• Javier Ceballos Gutierrez	EUROCONTROL
• Juan V. Balbastre	ITACA
• Karan Hofmann	RTCA
• Lee Gratz	Saab, Inc.
• Lee Nguyen	NUAIR, Inc.
• Maria Julia Sanchez Pinilla	EUROCONTROL
• Pavel Sedivy	RETIA, a.s.
• Pavel Soukup	Eldis
• Ryan Berry	FAA
• Tom Haritos	Kansas State University
• Torsten Kretschmann	DFS
• Tricia Fantinato	FAA
• Wilfred Lam	CAAS
• Xylene Gonzalez	Air Line Pilot Association

Meeting opened 15h05 CEST / 09h05 EDT.

Introduction by Adam, thanking those members who had contributed to the SPR/IR document to date. The purpose for today's meeting is to review and resolve comments received during the Open Consultation/Final Review and Comment (OC/FRAC). The goal is for SPR/INTEROP to approve forwarding the final document to Council and Program Management Committee for final approval and publication.

Tour de table – all participants online and in-person at the start of the meeting (22 in total) introduced themselves.

2. RTCA/EUROCAE Policy Material

Alex and Karan introduced the EUROCAE and RTCA policy slides.

3. Review Agenda

Agenda as proposed was agreed.

4. Review minutes from Plenary #18

Alex and Karan reviewed the minutes from meeting #18. Minutes were adopted at meeting.

5. SPR/INTEROP for non-cooperative UAS detection systems – Plenary #19 meeting minutes

The latest version of the document is accessible via the EUROCAE Workspace at https://eurocae.sharepoint.com/sites/strato/19aef671-15f9-e911-a813-000d3ab11b53/943d3092-15f9-e911-a813-000d3ab11026/Drafts/ED-322%20for%20OC_resolution.docx?d=w18c670663c064f38a51932981d20e0f7.

Comments received, responses, and actions taken are included in the WG Consolidated Comment form also located on both sites.

a. Meeting Minutes (October 24):

Team - The System Performance and Interoperability Requirements for Non-Cooperative UAS Detection Systems (the document) represents the first step for future versions. It is essentially guidance material, with some requirements, to assist users to develop specific requirements for their particular airport environments. Again, this plenary meeting was to address comments received during the OC/Frac process.

High and Non-Concur Comments

Groupe ADP Comments:

- Spreadsheet Comment #12: Concerns regarding non-cooperative definition - resolved.
 - **Julia** - provided general definitions at the beginning. In this initial document, not defining anything that is cooperative or non-cooperative rather the terms in this case focus on the technical equipment of the detection system sensor.
 - The focus of this initial effort is on what a C-UAS detection system can do. What are the functions of the DTI which are defined by the technology. Team is not reviewing protocols at this time since not enough information available to make informed recommendations. The initial efforts concentrate on the technology and identifying zones on and near an airport where UA should not be located.
 - Anticipate that upcoming documents will provide additional definitions.
- Command and Control (Comment #14 & 17) – Resolved.
 - **Julia** explained focus on functions of the DTI and functional blocks. See definitions in Sections 2.2.2. The team in this version is treating C-2 differently.
 - **Lee Nguyen** - tracking definition – tracking and correlating from sensors to the text to clarify. First, detect by multiple sensors that correlate the data then track. Fusing the data to correlate data and to provide tracking data. Add to text to clarify. Need to follow up with Javier regarding the additional text – discuss later.

- **Lee G. (SAAB)** – The term command and control was not used so that the text does not become overly prescriptive as it relates to the C-UAS system itself. Recommend leaving text as is for this version.
- Comment 18 – Lack of Sensor comment – Resolved.
 - **Team** – The scope of document is focused on drones operating in areas that they should not be. The Team’s focus is technology agnostic for this document. Team is explaining to the Airport Operator, how the detection system works so the Airport can make the decision if they need additional sensors. Since each airport is different, the document is providing some general guidance.
 - **Team** - Next report may consider but cannot integrate the comment here. The scope of this version is focused on detection technology not the system at all. They are not providing specifics.
 - **Juan B** – See Figure 5-1, does not refer to any specific technology. The C-UAS DTI system is a collection of sensors. Figure 5-1 is generic in order to identify what technologies could be used in a DTI system. The scope of this effort is focused on evaluating “non-cooperative detection systems”. The probability chapter highlights potential interfaces and external sources that systems may be able to use to identify cooperative and non-cooperative UA operations. Other organizations regularly collect this information. Recommend that this information should be made available for use in DTI systems and some sort of interface should be created. Anticipated that C-UAS equipped with this information may be more effective.
 - **Amaury** – From an ADP perspective, what team to provide information to help the airport chose different sensors to detection UA and to make sure that these sensors work in concert and provide required coverage.
- Comment #32 – Impact Zones – resolved.
 - Team will change the impact zone to illustrate that runway approach and departure zones must be incorporated into the impact zone. However, team will not replace the word “impact” with “danger”. The document focuses on the impact area around an airport as well as the potential risks that likely would occur in each of those zones.
- Comment 35 – resolved – the second sentence was replaced.
 - Comments regarding “danger zone” will not be included in this document since this document is focused on impact zones; it is up to the airport to determine if something is a danger. Will not replace the word impact with danger.
- Figure 2-2 – comment on the volumes – Resolved.
 - **Team** - the CAV is where the Counter systems can identify the non-cooperative drone (i.e., typical of surveillance systems). The document is supposed to set up safety performance requirements including requiring coverage of the system to extend beyond the limits of the safety critical areas. The system can detect, track and identify the drone (careless, clueless and criminal). All the zones in Chapter 4 require different levels of coverage.
 - The Airport operator can define different types of CAV based upon need. Try to identify something generic for all airports is very difficult. The Airport needs to monitor the drone within the zones around the airport even if they do not react to make sure that there could be an impact. Therefore, need to continue to monitor.

- **Discussion** – Request need to provide sufficient reaction time to identify the zones – the definitions do not specifics, but team defines the zones. There is an area around an airport where a DTI system that can provide specific performance for the user to determine potential impacts. While there may be surveillance that covers beyond that impact, this is the area that is high, medium and low – need to be determined.
 - Line 884: what you consider low impact? Request to define coverage by the DTI system include where DTI systems need to be located within the airport environment.
 - Comment 28 – resolved – Discussion: suggest adding text/guidance on where the C-UAS systems need to be placed to provide effective coverage. However, Team needs more information in order to develop scenarios where locations and standards are identified. Consider for next iteration of this document. Airport Critical zones may need to be updated in the future versions and potentially add a risk assessment to evaluate the different concerns within each of the zones.

Additional notes/Discussion

- High impact zones – **Amaury** definition – ‘where a collision with an aircraft within the runway approach and departure zones may cause collision with an aircraft. Impact zones should be defined as “red zones”’.
- Airport or runway closures are linked only with Red zones; no closure is associated with orange and yellow zones
- Table 3-2 – SSR_N10 – **Julia** - all the requirements outlined in Chapter 4 are defined in Chapter 3. Didn’t perform a risk assessment – didn’t have enough information for this version. The CAV is the volume.
- The performance requirements will be established in the CAV.
- Line 843: **Julia** - The Chapter 3 and 4 regarding the low, medium and high zones are just provided as general guidance. The next versions of this document will apply quantitative data to update these zones and area volumes.
- **Julia** – it is up to the Airport even if they want to use the zones. An airport operator may rather work with ATC to establish specific requirements based upon need. May use zones strictly for awareness.

EASA Comments: Team needs to speak with Thomas regarding outcomes.

- Line 873#: Safety performance – this document is system performance requirements; Need more information for risk assessment – applied a general safety assessment; go into more depth in next versions. Future will include a safety analysis. Change the paragraph to include better clarification for safety support assessment not a safety assessment. Contact EASA for agreement.
- Line 803: Refers to SSR N13 – Threat Report – what is expected for the performance of the C-UAS DTI system – qualitative not quantitative.
- Need to define the thresholds and limits – who determines the thresholds – users, airport operators, etc. An SPR – the applicability could be the manufacturer, the controller, regulator/law enforcement, - who is defining the limits. Next version – will provide the threat assessment – this is the function of the DTI to provide information. Need to provide information in a preamble that highlights that “all these requirements pertain to all C-UAS operators and users.”

- Julia – we are discussing the functioning of the systems; define the functional standards for the DTI. Next version will discuss the operators since this is focused on the systems themselves.
- This is guidance and awareness for users – some minimums that need to be fulfilled. The scope is quite limited in this first version. Trying to define information.
- 803: Lee (Saab) – not about the time – need to continuously monitor; need to revise text to clarify. The system can detect a target without a need to create a threat report. The timer starts as soon as the threat is assessed not when the drone is actually detected.
- SSR N13 – will be updated to provide specifics requiring the timing between the identification and response.
- Amaury – add the text abnormal UAS; Julia – we are just talking about the function of the DTI not the UAS. What requirements need to be taken into consideration.
- Lee – maybe change to threat detection – Julia that would violate the scope; so very limited. Normal conditions of the counter UAS – Abnormal conditions refer to the performance requirements of the DTI; not referring to a UAS (authorized vs unauthorized). This version is just about the DTI functional system.
- Explanation that detection is not taken as the first identification but rather when determined when establishing a threat assessment.
- Abnormal conditions of the counter-UAS DTI systems as a function of the system. Need to clarify EASA comment. ED-322: System performance and interoperability requirements of non-cooperative UAS Detection Systems (find initial scope). Response cannot be more than x-minutes for the threat report – otherwise the system DTI is not effective.
- Table 3-2: SSR A2 – Built in test equipment (BITE) – if the DTI does not work correctly – EASA needs to provide additional clarification.
 - The team considered abnormal and faulted conditions for the DTI systems. – require additional clarification from EASA
 - Alex – the BITE systems should be able to provide information on an abnormal event or fault in the system (the system will generate this information to the user). The C-UAS system shall include some way to monitor its own system that report if there is some abnormal function or operations.
 - Performance requirement on the BITE itself to report issues to the user.
 - Potentially embed BITE into both normal and abnormal cases. – report abnormalities and fault conditions – incorporate in both sections to address both issues with the DTI systems themselves. Keep reporting for BITE requirement in section 3.3.
- SSR F – put all “F” under normal operations – are there normal and abnormal conditions? Need to define in tables to provide better definition regarding the table titles.
 - In future versions – need to define specifications within the tables to provide better output; define in the future the safety specifications.
 - What does it mean to be “working properly” - safety support requirements that the DTI is functioning properly and cannot be the same as under abnormal conditions.
 - Need more definitions and descriptions to provide users understanding for requirements –

- Alex performance factors in good weather vs bad weather. The BITE system can produce a report regarding fault conditions of the system. These are all performance requirements on the systems themselves. – minimums expected from these technologies.
- More safety requirements that may be added to the table.

FAA Comments: FAA team determined that based upon current scope of first deliverable to hold comments/recommendations for inclusion into upcoming reports. Non-concur comments resolved.

- The FAA agreed to downgrade comments from Non-concur to High.
- Make sure comments that could be included in the next scope but requested that those items outside the SOW that the team identify for consideration.
- Limitations of the scope – need to address whether in the scope and outside scope.
- Mitigation outside this project.
- The next version may talk about mitigation – Adam’s comments provide some recommendations on how the Team may address in future versions.
- There are references to UTM but the document does not go into the depth of detail that Adam highlighted.
- Potential to add another chapter that at a very high level could address some of these comments. However, agreed that if team would consider as part of future documents, FAA will support.

Miscellaneous Comments:

- Safety Specific Item (SVS) – Julia is removing term “item” and making just safety specific.

Low, Medium and Editorial Comments

Weibel’s Comments:

- Comment 104 – team did not agree to Note on Chapter 4 – team wants to keep; need to cover the landside areas in future versions this is why a note was added.
- Changes requested were reviewed and approved. Need review and make sure that terms are used correctly (i.e., Detection systems vs C-UAS systems). Need to be reviewed by working group leaders.

Groupe ADP Comments:

- Clarify the definitions in line 206; some definitions were embedded – proposal to remove the definition since it doesn’t provide any meaning.
- False positives and negatives – add definitions that are not covered in the document.
- Geographical constraints – include both natural and manmade added to text.
- In the alerting function (graphic) it is supposed to show if the UAS is authorized vs unauthorized
- Flow from the detection to identification to tracking...
 - **Amaury** – “alerting” may be a threat or not a threat – need to classify – as authorized “no threat” to ATO. Team is considering that even an authorized drone could be a threat. If it is operating in a place that it shouldn’t be still a threat to the airport.
 - Need to track, identify and verify data regarding the UAS. – can you differentiate between a UAS vs non-UAS including authorized vs non-authorized. Next

version may include additional classifications and then identify and then have the alert function.

- **Amaury** – need to limit the number of alerts sent to ATC to limit the impacts on operations. Could be a threat – new alert - Julia – this is the minimum that the DTI system must do. They are not mentioning the operational and protocols required since don't know this information. Someone needs to notify ATC and Law enforcement – the current guidance does not require notification of DTI.
- Anticipate DTI systems alert, identify, perform and provide analysis that the Airport and law enforcement can use to adjust protocols. Try to avoid nuisance alert and false alerts that may impact safety requirement – nothing in the document. Julia – do not have enough information to evaluate – who is going to monitoring and keeping a c-UAS system.
- **Lee N** – need to add significant functional requirements (SSR) regarding alerting; need to add how to address false alerts and nuisance alerts.
 - Functional architecture of DTI and defining the functional blocks
 - Need at very high level – add SSR for False Alerts – should not be established by parameter specialized by the operator. Add limits in general that the SME – provide limits for false alarms.
 - Julia – want to keep the definition very high level to support the graphic in the text.
 - Still systems are being tested to define the performance requirements to address the functional blocks – use assumptions based upon existing information.
- Line 206 – the airport doesn't care what the type of drone is it.
 - **Julia** - However, however, a fixed wing is hard to manage compared to rotary wing – Julia. There is a difference in classification – airspace, payload, weight – depending upon the type of drone. Classification is provided to show that the type of UAS does make a difference in determining potential threat.
- Comment #19 - Redundancy design is beyond the current scope but will be included in future version. Team will be adding some text regarding in Redundancy.
- **Lee G.**- Draw distinction between redundancy and system design vs advocacy for multi-layered security approach. Julia recommending Javier address.
- **Lee N** – add a note regarding redundancy requirements that articulate what is noted above. – text to be added.
- No classification of sensors is highlighted in this document since out of scope – hopefully will be included in future. The current version is system agnostic.
- When initially defined the scope both in EUROCAE and RTCA, UTM was not included in scope. Need to further develop UTM in the next versions of the report. There is some discussion of UTM//U in line 999 of the existing document but need to expand.
- Not talking about Command and control in this document.
- Change figure 3-2 to address the functional blocks of the DTI systems.
- Countermeasures, integration and information recording will be addressed in next version. Figure 3-2 needs to be clarified to illustrate that it focuses strictly on the Detection and how it works with users.
- Change to adverse weather conditions rather than extreme.

- Generating a threat report – false negative considering lack of report. See DM4.
- False negative detection – SSR-F7- note that false positives could occur during normal conditions – need to address in next version. Currently keeping tables (normal and abnormal) to address concerns.
 - SSR_F7 – is not the same as the false detection requirement; Team needs to add text to address the false detection that mis-identify the number of drones or misclassify data (i.e., incorrectly identify swarm of drones vs one drone).

Outstanding Items:

- The team leads need to address any outstanding comments by organizations so it will still have to address these issues in the next versions.

Meeting Adjourned: 3:06 PM EST_ Reconvene tomorrow at 9 am.

b. Meeting Minutes (October 25): Reconvened 9 am EST

Team focused on addressing remaining medium, low and editorial comments from OC/FRAC review.

Groupe ADP Comments:

- Concerns - Systems under SSr_4 and SSRA1 – minimum performance requirements – false positives and false negatives.
 - **Lee N** - SSR_4 high level performance requirement; top hierarchy that captures this information – victor should engage in resolution of this data. Any sensor performance requirements – all interim MOPS very detailed false positive and false negative data – need to address to an acceptable level.
 - **Amaury** - To avoid incorrect responses regarding these systems; establish maximum rate of 1000 drone; establish requirements for false positives and negatives.
 - **Alex** - False negative and False Positives are different.
 - **Lee N**– FN and FP are a malfunction that could provide erroneous information to the user regarding potential UA.
 - **Alex** - Failure to detect or failure to detect if a UA is a threat or not.
 - **Lee N** – could provide correct detection; but the report may be erroneous rather not provide the correct information.
 - **Julia** – suggest putting the scenarios that Lee and Alex are describing into the next version since not part of this initial scope of work.
 - **Lee N** – suggesting that we need to incorporate more data as to the initial document regarding False Positive and Negative discussions.
 - Look at all SSRs that the team – don't need to have an operational safety assessment – these requests are rather performance requirements.
 - Working on this document for 2 years, but at the point of finalizing phase I report.
 - **Lee N** – recommend adding a high level SBR performance base for False positives and negatives to be included in future versions. Should use a term Performance Requirements and SSR; other stuff should be safety requirement in the future version. Just high level of performance requirement.

- **Karan** – need to get the chapter expert involved before can resolve the comment.
- Comment: “Precise not of airspace”:
 - **Julia** – the refinement of this definition regarding “climb and approach areas” will be incorporated in future version since not going into high detail within this first version. Chapter 4 is very generic – provide general airport critical zones.
 - **Amaury** – please consider this comment regarding control zones since there are different types of control zones (I.e., airport control zone critical) in the next version. – agreed to resolve as long as covered in next detailed document.
 - **Lee**: ICAO Annex 14 provides recommendations regarding airport design and construction. Moving obstructions. Tricia: Can also use FAA 150/5300-13A – Airport Design.
 - **Julia** - need to incorporate in the future versions beyond just the zones.
- Comment: “Precise impact on safety and security operations” – this is out of scope so will be incorporated in next version.
 - The next scope will consider all these comments and try to incorporate. This will include critical infrastructure as well as other critical systems and zones in and around the airport.
- Comment: “critical areas and buffer zones” –
 - **Amaury** – this buffer is required for each zone (high, medium and low); the concern is operational to allow time to identify and respond including provide information to ATC.
 - **Julia** – will require the set-up of protocols; the zones that are shown are just a reference for the airport operator to provide ideas where there may be issues.
 - **Amaury** – the buffer zone is required for the operator which will allow them time to address and identify the potential threat and notify the operations, ATC and Aircraft.
 - **Julia** – not every airport is the same; they need time to contact Law enforcement authorities; will add text about the buffer zone and explain the purpose of the buffer zone.
 - **Lee** – make sure that you have adequate reaction time even including the SSR that we have. The DTI accuracy may could have a large acceptable error. Suggest that the ADP provide text to be incorporated into the text. Suggest adding a specific definition within the document to clearly state that this is in regard to the DTI and that it is up to the Airport to consider the need for a buffer zone. Note the buffer zone could adjust (get bigger or smaller) to consider the speed of the UA as well as the DTI technology improves. Wait for input from ADP.
 - **Alex Milns** – see text chat below.
 - **Julia** – need to be more precise in the alerting section to explain the alerting time and buffer; this also requires adding scenarios – all of this needs to be captured in the future versions.
 - **Alex/Lee** – there is already an altitude buffer so very easy to add in a lateral buffer – brief descriptions.
 - **ADP Chat** - “Each critical zone has to be enlarged to take into consideration a buffer zone, whose width is sufficient to have time to analyze a possible UAS threat from an average UAS speed.”

- **Lee G**– time to abort an approach or departure; consider mitigation technologies; determination of the buffer zone.
 - Adding text provide ADP to consider each critical area – high and medium.
 - **Julia** – add some simple text describe the purpose of a lateral buffer in addition to an altitude buffer suggest general description in Table 4-1. More description and prescriptive recommendations will be provided in the future.
 - **Lee N** - Each of critical zones – need to include some sort of performance assessment type of alert and buffer system – it is between each of the zones to determine the type of loading requirement. The (lateral and vertical impact zones to establish the type of loading requirement) depend upon the type of alerts and the type of C-UAS.
- Responsibilities are out of scope for this effort; But will be considered in amendment to OSED and expanded version of this document.
 - Collaborative decision making – out of this current scope and considered in future versions. Very high-level discussion in 1075 of Chapter 5.
 - Comments to be considered in future versions of documents.

EASA Comments: - Team agreed with comments and incorporated into the document.

- The team has incorporated most of the editorial comments from EASA into this document.
- The Discussion about C-UAS DTI – make the changes in Chapter 2 that to specify when speaking about C-UAS in general and only C-UAS DTI systems.
- Some of the EASA comments overlap with Hendrick from Weibel.
- **Maury** – in future versions please highlight (comment #51) – the approach and departure procedures and position of aircraft.
- Comment #58 – rejected recommendation; Javier provided data to justify why not changing text as requested.
 - **Lee** – it is a good editorial comment from EASA – suggest need to add future document analysis.
 - **Alex and Julia** - Javier is the top expert in EUROCAE regarding C-UAS.; Javier will need to explain to EASA why the comment was rejected.
 - **Karan** – for the conclusion of the spreadsheet and direction – need concurrence and approval by the EASA.
- Line 315 – EASA – Javier will need to discuss with EASA on why the team rejected.
- Line 803 – Javier/Team leads will need to discuss with EASA.
- Line 837-The team made references to Runways within different sections of the document.
- Line 852 – question about movement zones and landing area; the explanation and description of the critical zones – runways are covered – Comment addressed. Added text “runways, takeoff and landing areas, etc.” The helipads although covered in the takeoff and landing areas are not specifically called out since will be covered in more detail next report version(s).
- Line 857 – Team agreed to include “high impact areas off the airport property” in Chapter 4 and associated graphics.
Line 916/927 -
- 936 – updated to specifically identify that Passive DTI “should not” impact or cause interference

- Line 1099 – update to change former to UTM/U-Space services.

Team Discussion/Comments:

- **Lee Nguyen:** SBR Document UTM/U-space services; Julia – this is about the information regarding the C-UAS DTI system only. The UTM/U-Space item need to be incorporated in the next version.
- **Lee N.**– Page 35 – Recommendation Table – Earlier version had set of data required for this interface. Section I5 – ASTM F3411-22A, provided an ASTM standard and also provide protocol of interface for future systems. Suggests that add text that ASTM F3411-22A also include tools that are developed for FAA LAANC/ EASA Tool (EZ Access for UAS); There was a paragraph removed, so Lee suggests adding back a sentence to the text.
- **Karan** – need to present the text to the team for consensus since there must be a reason that this information was not included in this document.
- **Lee G. I6 and I7** – there is information that was removed from the text. Lee suggests adding another sentence to Table 5-2 and Section I5.
- **Amaury** – take of the term of impact but rather just change to high, medium and low. The impact zone is only for the red zones. Line 847 – suggest removing the word “impact” from the title of Criticality – High, Medium and Low.
- **Lee G** – however it depends on how impact is defined – just this mean taking some action.
- **Amaury** – impact specifically refers to the likely impact to the operation or closure of the runway (i.e., critical zone).
- **Julia** – the airport needs to make an impact threat assessment.
- **Amaury** – the DTI operator will make a decision alone if operating in Low and Mid zones; rather ATC will be included in the High Impact zone(s)
- **Lee N** – suggest a sentence that requires airport authority zone; Julia requires that a threat assessment impact report needs to be included.
- **Julia** – they never use collaborative and non-collaborative; each airport that is unique. The drones that may be allowed to operate in the airport could cause an impact/risk to operations. The operator must analyze of a low, medium and high impact. We agreed to keep the word impact in the title of criticality zones; Impact needs to be defined. ATC they only care about the perimeter of that airport. However, note that airport operations do care about the airspace area outside of the land perimeter of the property.
- **Amaury** – suggests removing the criticality from impact medium and low since Charles DeGaulle is completely within the red zone. However, could an airport use a buffer zone instead of yellow and orange.
- **Julia** – it will depend on who the operator and how it is defined. It is dependent upon how the airport is using the system. The definitions and buffers are required to determine how these airport operators address the potential impacts of a drone incursion or a drone allowed to operate but non-responsive. This document is specifically a guidance document; expansion of terms and requirements will be required in the future. However, it is up to the airport operator, working with C-UAS systems, to make decisions regarding zones, impacts and responses to potential UAS.
- **Lee G:** Need more airports to participate on this team. Look at getting the team from Tampa back on it. Recommend leaving the zones and text as is. He says that the U-Space

from EASA exists; However, Julia says that this has not been approved as of yet and is not mandatory.

- **Julia** – insists that only RID was approved/regulated. U-Space and UTM are still a work in progress and have not been approved by EASA. Therefore, since the U-Space and UTM services were not part of the initial scope, it is not included in this version of the document. However, future versions may be considered for future versions of this document.
- **Julia** – a lot of information was put in the documents but was removed based upon input, what could be justified, and what could be supported. There was limited data and studies available at the time that were used; the team chose to limit this version of the draft to those documents only. Also included/interface with law enforcement agencies and will work with them in more depth along with U-SPACE operators in the future.
- **Team** – important to note that need to develop an acceptable level of compliance for these C-UAS systems. However, right now, these systems are not mature enough to be effectively used in an airport environment.

Webex Chat Key Points:

- Alex Milns – EUROCAE, 10:08 AM: “Zones of High and Medium impact should be designed with a lateral buffer zone beyond the area of immediate concern. This, to gain as much reaction time as possible should a threat be inbound to the area of concern.”
- Amaury NEYRON de SAINT JULIEN, Groupe ADP, 10:10 AM: “Each critical zone has to be enlarged to take into consideration a buffer zone, whose width is sufficient to have time to analyse a possible UAS threat, from an average UAS speed”
- Amaury NEYRON de SAINT JULIEN, Groupe ADP, 10:27 AM: “the rationale for the buffer zone relies on the principle that we exchange space for time, depending on an average speed of a drone”
- Amaury NEYRON de SAINT JULIEN, Groupe ADP, 11:25 AM: “I only have a small regret for not explaining better my proposal to modify the name of the 3 zones because the term "impact" is only correct for the red zone but not for the medium and light zones. We could have kept only the criticality High Medium and Light by suppressing the notion of "impact" (line 847)”
- Lee Nguyen, NUAIR, Inc., 11:29 AM: “UTM/U-Space services may provide to C-UAS UTM/U-Space information such as airspace constraints, UA operational intent data, Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability/Easy Access for UAS, and Remote ID data.”

6. Decision required: Proceed to finalize SPR/INTEROP document for Council and PMC review, and timeline

Alex and Karan requested any additional comments or objectives to finalizing document. No objectives received from those in attendance to finalizing document for Council and PM Committee review.

Alex and Karan presented suggested timeline for submittal to Council and PMC in December 2023 with likely final publication shortly thereafter or beginning of 2024.

7. Review Actions/Next Steps

- Julia and Alex – final light editing in preparation for Council and PM Committee review.

- Alex – Julia and the chapter leaders will go back and clarify the remaining comments with the commentators; make final integration and submit. Julia stated likely to finalize response to comments by end of the week (10/27/2023)
- Karan and Alex – anticipate using next Plenary can be used to approve the draft for publication.
- Alex – what is the deadline to PMC members – 14th of December or approval out of cycle approach. However, may wait until March 2024.
- Karan – The December PMC meeting suspense is 14 November (30 days prior to the meeting). Next steps are to update the text, post the document on the EUROCAE and RTCA SharePoint sites and get input.
- Karan – Anticipate next plenary November 9th with PMC meeting on December 14th.
- Julia to send Alex document for EUROCAE editing.
- Alex will submit to Karan between 6-8th of November for plenary. If delayed for 30-day submission requirement to the December PMC meeting then will be submitted for the March 14, 2024, meeting with concurrent submission to the EUROCAE Council for March 2024 publication.

8. Any Other Business

Nil

9. Set Future Meetings

Plenary Meeting #20: 9 November – WEBEX – Approve SPR/INTEROP to forward to Council and Program Management Committee for final approval and publication.

10. Adjourn

Adam acknowledged the efforts of Julia in particular the ongoing commitment of members to the work in getting us to this point in the development of the SP-IR document.

Julia also thanked the chapter leaders.

Meeting closed at 12h29 CEST / 10h25 EDT.

Minutes prepared by Tricia Fantinato – SC-238 GAR